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Scholars of socialist cities often refer to the gap between the collectivistic ideology 
underpinning socialist urban planning and the centrality of the private in everyday life. Socialist 
urban planners and policy-makers maintained that the material basis of the socialist city would 
produce new social forms and moral values. This ideological starting point was reflected in 
collective property relations, the expansion of the public sphere, the uniformity of the built 
environment, standardisation of housing, and communal living in residential neighbourhoods.1 
Historical and anthropological studies of socialist urbanity in Eastern Europe have noted, 
however, that the collectivist aspirations of socialist urban planners did not materialise. On the 
one hand, the implementation of urban planning clashed with the material contingencies of pre-
socialist cities, the prioritisation of heavy industry over urban development, and massive rural-
to-urban migration.2 On the other hand, the state’s authoritarian control of the public sphere 
forced individuals to withdraw to private realms for individual agency and emotional 
investment. In actually existing socialist cities, the public and private were infused with 
diametrically opposing moral categories.3  
Housing is one of the domains where this binary opposition is most evident. In programmatic 
accounts of socialist urbanity, the home was socially-owned, standardised, and uniform. Large 
parts of the functions traditionally ascribed to the household would be transferred to communal 
units, either the residential building or the neighbourhood. Historical anthropologies of socialist 
urbanity found, however, that the home in subjective practice was upgraded into a heterotopic 
private space that was invested with personhood and diametrically opposed the amoral and 
impersonal public space. In this line of literature, the sharp bifurcation between the private 
home and the public space forms the “simple geography of socialism”, reflecting the political 
and ideological fault-lines between public and private cutting across socialist societies.4 This 
private-public reconfiguration was also evident in property relations. Although programmatic 
prospects of socialist urbanity marginalised private property, detached houses in private 
ownership remained commonplace all over Socialist Eastern Europe. This is broadly 
understood as an indicator of the preference of broad parts of the population for private 
ownership and the failure of state-sponsored urbanisation programmes.5  
The dualist housing sector in Socialist Yugoslavia is a particular variation on this theme. 
Parallel to the split with the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia developed its own form of Socialism 
under the banner of social self-management. The country politically and ideologically distanced 
itself from so-called state administrative socialism of the Soviet Bloc and delegated ownership 
to society as a whole. Economic decision-making was decentralised from state administration 
to workers’ councils, the economy was increasingly liberalised and opened to Western trade, 
and enterprises were intended to perform according to the logic of the market.6 The particular 
organisation of housing in Socialist Yugoslavia reflects the relatively liberal character of its 
economy. The so-called social sector was run by enterprises and municipalities and 
predominantly oriented toward high-rise residential buildings in urban areas. It subscribed to 
the collectivist underpinnings of modernist urban planning. The private sector evolved in 
parallel in detached single-family houses in the urban outskirts and the rural areas and largely 
evaded formal urban planning. The private sector accounted for around 60–70% of the annual 
housing production, making the country a trendsetter in socialist Eastern Europe.7 A specific 
feature of private homebuilding in Socialist Yugoslavia was its informal character. Informal 
individual agency is inherent to urban development in the region, from the squatter settlements 
in growing interwar cities to middle-class post-socialist suburbs.8 Yet, the spatial organisation, 
material qualities, scope, and durability of informal housing during socialism makes the 
phenomenon stand out. Entire single-family house settlements rose in the urban peripheries in 
apparent complete disregard of socialist urban regulations. These settlements provide some sort 
of material and spatial mirror image of the vertical, spacious, and compact social-sector 
administrative centres and housing estates.9 
Socialist Yugoslavia was organised as a federal state. Political and economic decision-
making were decentralised to the six republics and two autonomous regions within the Republic 
of Serbia. Socio-economic inequalities between the units of the federal state were enormous 
and continuously grew, regardless of federal funding for the accelerated development of 
underdeveloped regions.10 The Yugoslav development gap was evident in housing as well. In 
Kosovo, an autonomous region and later province within the Republic of Serbia and the least 
developed and urbanised unit of the federal state, shares of private homeownership reached 
90%.11 Although the province witnessed rapid urbanisation after the Second World War, social-
sector urban development was restricted. Census results of 1971 indicate that for Yugoslavia as 
a whole, the share of social-sector dwellings in cities alone was 38%. In cities in Kosovo, only 
20% of the dwellings was socially-owned.12 Social-sector housing was primarily concentrated 
in the capital Prishtina (Serbian: Priština) and to a lesser extent Mitrovica, the model industrial 
city of the province.13 The limited reach of social-sector urban development converged with 
ethnic divisions, as Albanians, who made up for the majority of the population in the province, 
were overrepresented not only among the rural population but also among the private 
homeowners in cities.14 Considering the expulsion/withdrawal of Albanians from the public 
sphere and ethno-political mobilisation in the 1980s, the open tensions and violent warfare of 
the 1990s, and the continuing partitioning of Kosovan society along ethno-political fault lines 
until the present, it seems particularly convincing to project these deep social rifts back onto 
the social-private duality in socialist cities of Kosovo.   
This paper, however, suggests a different reading which challenges the focus on the 
politicised duality between private and social spheres in socialist cities and explores private-
social reconfigurations as an integral part of socialist urban development. It is inspired by recent 
accounts of socialist urbanity that challenge the “failure-centrism” in the scholarship on 
socialist architecture and planning and instead highlight the achievements of socialist 
urbanisation and housing programmes, the future-oriented endurance of the socialist built 
environment, and the intimate connections of inhabitants with socialist housing.15 This 
revaluation has particularly strong implications for analysing private-public reconfigurations in 
socialist cities, as it undermines the sharp private-public division considered characteristic for 
socialist cities.16 Failure-centred studies of socialist urbanity rarely take into account the 
processual nature of urban development. They evaluate actually-existing socialist cities against 
a supposedly inert and fixed idea of socialist modernity predicated on anti-Capitalist and anti-
individualistic basic tenets. Anna Krylova has recently suggested an alternative view of Soviet 
socialist modernity that takes into account the dynamics of social and cultural change 
throughout the twentieth century. She introduced the concept of “post-Bolshevik socialist 
modernity” to capture alternative individualising discourses of Soviet socialist modernity, 
which “foreground personal and private aspects of the self and presuppose a differentiation 
between the self and its social milieu”.17 This individualising turn also applies to socialist urban 
planning after the Second World War. Mark B. Smith highlighted the cooperative nature of the 
mass urban housing programme in the Soviet Union after the Second World War, which 
integrated individual housing strategies into urban development.18 In their programmatic 
account of post-1945 urban societies in Europe, Smith and Moritz Föllmer argue that individual 
self-reliance and ownership were an integral feature of urban societies in Eastern Europe as 
well, notwithstanding the ideological preference for collectivism.19  
The market-oriented reforms of the mid-1960s in Socialist Yugoslavia are one of the more 
evident indicators of the individualising turn in socialist urban development after the Second 
World War.20 In this article, I take a closer look at local decision-making processes behind the 
shifting private-social configurations in a peripheral medium-sized city in Socialist Yugoslavia. 
In looking for characteristics features of “the socialist city”, studies of socialist urbanity tend to 
focus on capital cities or exemplary new towns, thereby excluding the particular experiences of 
so many small and medium-sized socialist cities. I argue that local decision-making in smaller 
peripheral cities demonstrates the open-ended character of socialist urban planning and the 
constant negotiation between individual housing strategies and planning measures by local 
actors, including professional urban planners, local party representatives, and enterprises. This 
article presents the case-study of Mitrovica, a medium-sized city in Kosovo. In terms of size 
and political relevance, the city was of secondary importance in Socialist Yugoslavia. For 
Kosovo, however, Mitrovica was the model industrial city as the seat of the high-priority 
mining, metallurgy, and chemical industry enterprise Trepça (Trepča). The city’s population 
grew rapidly from less than 15,000 after the Second World War to over 50,000 in the 1980s. 
The prioritised access of Trepça to central funding was reflected in the, at least for Kosovan 
standards, intensive urban development and large share of social-sector housing. The 
monopolistic hold of Trepça on social-sector urban development concentrated social-sector 
housing in a compact zone of priority on the less densely built terrain north of the Ibër (Ibar) 
River. The enterprise had the last word in housing allocation, which resulted in socio-
occupational overrepresentation of management cadres and technical specialists in the northern 
part of the city.21 On the other side of the river, socialist urbanisation relied on the degradation 
of Mitrovica’s Ottoman-era commercial and residential centre. The reconstruction of the 
Ottoman city centre went underway in the second half of the 1970s but remained fragmentary 
and layered. Massive migration to the city greatly surpassed the capacities of social-sector 
house construction. In such conditions of under-urbanisation, rural migrants resorted to 
informal homebuilding in single-family house settlements in the urban periphery. These were 
primarily located on the greenfield sites to the southwest of the city centre.22 Based on 
embedded research of archival sources of the municipality and local press, this article explores 
shifting social understandings of private- and social-sector urban development from the late 
1950s until the early 1980s. 
 
Private-sector homebuilding: From illegal to wild 
In 1962, the municipal authorities of Mitrovica for the first time discussed “illegal” individual 
homebuilding. Over 200 cases of illegal building had been registered in 1960 and 1961. The 
report found that most of these houses were built by rural-to-urban migrants, for whom it was 
argued that they had sufficient means for private homebuilding in line with municipal 
regulations and that they were well aware of the building requirements, but nevertheless opted 
for informal house construction. They built houses themselves, using low-quality timber and 
self-made brick. The houses were of low hygienic standards and often poorly isolated, and 
formed “settlements with the rough contours of scattered houses without order and adequate 
roads”.23 These individual building activities jeopardised the orderly development of the city 
and brought “primitive” standards and “the ambient of the village into the city”.24 The discourse 
used in the report, which labelled individual homebuilding “illegal”, “primitive”, and “rural”, 
clearly excluded individual homebuilders from the normative space and time of socialist 
urbanity.  
Actual practice was, however, more ambiguous than the report suggests. The municipal 
authorities ordered informal homebuilders to suspend construction and pay a relatively low fine, 
but rarely went over to demolition. In 1961, for example, only nine informal houses were 
actually demolished.25 In the 1960s, informal house construction remained stable at around 200 
registered new houses per year. It seldom, if ever, came to demolition, even in those cases where 
the court ordered so.26 How should we explain the lenient politics of the local authorities? Were 
they caught off guard by the subversive practices and Eigen-Sinn of individual homebuilders? 
Did they lack sufficient state power or legitimacy and thus opted not to intervene in order to 
preserve social peace? Recent research has shown that informal homebuilding stood beyond 
categories of legality and formality and that homebuilders acted outside the framework of 
socialist urban planning.27 This article elaborates on this argument but suggests a slightly 
different reading, which highlights the reciprocate conformation between individual 
homebuilders and urban planners against the background of the open-ended character and 
individualising turn in socialist urban planning in the 1960s and 70s.  
Local discussions on illegal building took place at the time the municipality was adopting 
its first general urbanistic plan.28 With its focus on compactness, vertical residential building, 
functional zoning, and neighbourhood-scale social integration, the urban plan in many ways 
formalised a more collectivist understanding of socialist urbanity, reminiscent of what Krylova 
would term “Bolshevik modern” socialist urban planning. It was the work of a professional 
architectural studio from Belgrade, while the actual implementation of the plan was the 
competence of the newly established municipal office for urbanism. Constant revisions of the 
general urbanistic plan during the subsequent years and decades indicate that urban planning in 
socialist cities, as elsewhere in post-war Europe, was open-ended and subject to practical 
solutions that were “consistent with ideological prescriptions, but … stretched the boundaries 
of ideological purity”.29 Much more than the general urbanistic plan, local discussions 
surrounding the actual implementation of the plan demonstrate the processual nature and 
individualising turn in socialist urban thinking. In a context of housing shortage in a small and 
rapidly growing city, which had limited or no adequate pre-socialist housing and infrastructure, 
local representatives of the League of Communists found that “the idea that the municipal 
people’s council was obliged to supply a flat to everybody was untenable” and that “it was 
maybe necessary to secure certain funds for providing credit for private construction”. This 
option was clearly a solution for socially vulnerable parts of the population, with no access to 
social-sector housing.30  
In order to comprehend the scope of the housing shortage, it is useful to quote from one of 
the many reports composed by the municipal commission for housing. When residents made 
requests for social-sector housing, the commission visited their current flat to confirm whether 
or not their housing need was urgent. In the case of the Vlašković family, the commission noted 
that the family lived in one room of less than nine square metres, which had served as a summer 
kitchen. The room was old and decayed and the danger of collapse was real. The humidity and 
the smell were unbearable. In winter, ice formed in the room. In this case, as in many others, 
the commission recognised that the family should receive a new flat.31 In principle, residents 
who obtained such a confirmation had priority access to social-sector housing. Given the 
housing shortage, however, the chances of the Vlašković family were slim. In 1965, for 
example, it was estimated that there were 3000 residents on the waiting list for social-sector 
housing, while the municipality and Trepça only constructed 300 new dwellings per year and a 
substantial part of these went to specialists and management.32 This situation caused 
considerable social dissatisfaction. Already in 1959, the municipality’s people’s council noted 
that housing distribution was one of the most urgent and difficult questions, which “we are not 
even close to solving”.33 Vojislav Petrović and his family lived in a small and moisty room of 
three by three metres. With irony and anger, he wrote the commission to finally take his 
“thousandth” request into account, wondering if it was really normal that he was “poisoning his 
family in some kind of private cellars in our Socialist common and equal country of today, 
although I am sure that I and my late parents, brothers, and sisters did not contribute less to this 
country and the current socialist system and freedom than many of those who received … flats 
and who change their home constantly to have a larger flat or for a better quality of living.”34 
On the other hand, individual homebuilders did not situate themselves out of the framework 
of socialist urban development. Historical anthropology shows that individual homebuilders 
retrospectively couch construction in the language register of Yugoslav socialism and its 
temporality of linear progression. In other words, they do not make sense of informal 
homebuilding as an act of subversion undermining formal socialist urbanisation.35 Reports by 
the municipal inspectorate for housing on illegal homebuilders present similar findings. The 
case of Alit Dženajev, worker in the local catering company, is illustrative. In May 1961, the 
municipal office for communal and housing affairs ordered Dženajev to “immediately suspend” 
the construction of a small shed of 7 by 2.5 meters because he could not present an official 
permit for construction and because the shed was located in a zone for high-rise housing. 
Dženajev started the usual appeal procedures which ultimately took him to the provincial 
authorities in Prishtina. He first called on his partisan and socialist credentials, explaining that 
he was a war invalid, production worker, and the only wage earner in a family of eight. He 
rented a room in a private house, but after being forced out by the owner he saw no other option 
than to start the construction of a small house. He made clear in his appeal that he had 
conformed to formal urban development requirements. He had built on his “own piece of land” 
in an “out-of-the-way street” in the vicinity of other small adobe houses. Moreover, he had tried 
on several occasion to obtain formal permission for the construction with the municipal 
authorities, but was repeatedly told to wait until the adoption of the general urbanistic plan. 
Awaiting an official construction permit, he continued the construction works and moved in 
with his family.36 Dženajev clearly located himself and his home within the normative here and 
now of socialist urbanity. He was an urban wageworker with partisan credentials. Unlike rural-
to-urban migrants, whom the municipal authorities criticised for using the money they had 
earned in the village – presumably in speculative manners – to move to the city and consciously 
circumventing urban regulations, Dženajev could legitimately claim the right to housing. He 
had been forced to rent an expensive room from a private house owner due to the urban housing 
shortage. He had even conformed to the procedures of socialist urban planning, by officially 
requesting permission for individual house construction and building his house in a peripheral 
part of the city, where it would presumably not interfere with long-term social-sector urban 
development.  
By the time the urban plan was adopted in 1963, over 2,000 individuals had formally applied 
for permission for individual house construction.37 Of these, a very limited number actually 
gained permission, because urban development focussed on high-rise residential buildings in 
the northern part of the city. Informal individual homebuilders, however, did not completely 
evade urban planning. They concentrated their building activities in Tavnik, a relatively flat 
greenfield area between the city centre and the villages to the south and southwest of the city, 
which had been designated as the zone for detached houses from the earliest conceptualisations 
of urbanistic development in the mid-1950s. Informal homebuilders often bought land just 
outside the urban area, making use of a legal gap resulting from the sharp differentiation in 
property regimes between urban and rural areas. Land outside the delineated urban area 
remained in private ownership, could be sold, and was not subjected to urban construction 
regulations. Osman Hasani, for example, objected to an order of the municipal inspectorate for 
housing to suspend “illegal” house construction, stating that the deed of sale for his piece of 
land in Tavnik had been certified by the district court and that others had confirmed that he 
could build in the area.38 The fact that Hasani could officially buy the land means that it was 
located outside of the urban area and in principle did not fall under the urban planning 
requirements.  
The negotiations between private homebuilders and the municipality’s urban planners had 
considerable implications for urban development. The municipal authorities repeatedly 
expanded the administrative urban area in order to integrate compact settlements for individual 
homebuilding in the urban environment. In the final phase of the adoption of the general 
urbanistic plan in 1963, for example, the municipality opted to “fit inhabited informal houses 
into the urbanistic whole”.39 It enlarged the zone for individual house construction to include 
the growing informal house settlement in Tavnik.40 Owners of informal illegal houses that could 
not be fit into the urban plan were given the opportunity to remove their houses to the designated 
zone.41 The municipal authorities at the same time warned that there would be no more 
toleration of informal homebuilding and put in place formal procedures for individual house 
construction by developing land for individual house construction.42 Administrative procedures 
for obtaining building permits and credit for individual family houses became faster and easier, 
particularly targeting the most vulnerable strata of the urban population.43 In practice, however, 
the municipality failed to develop sufficient land to cover the enormous demand for urban land 
for individual homebuilding.44 In 1966, the municipal assembly once more discussed the issue 
and decided that those “illegal” houses that could be included into the urban plan – which meant 
that they were located in designated zones – would not be demolished.45 This process was 
repeated in 1971, when the municipality formally legalised informal houses that were located 
in areas designated for individual house construction, provided that owners would align their 
houses with urban construction requirements and pay land development taxes. Owners of 
informal houses that were not located in designated areas were given the right to rebuild their 
houses in detached housing areas.46 In this process, the municipality repeatedly expanded the 
urban area, particularly in southward direction.47 
One important outcome of this constant manoeuvring was that the boundary between city 
and rural hinterland became blurred, confirming the pre-socialist urban-rural hybridity in the 
region.48 The dual-sector development model of Socialist Yugoslavia sharply differentiated the 
urban core from its rural hinterland. Public-sector industrial economy, with the corresponding 
socio-economic benefits of wages, child allowances, housing, consumption, and political 
representation in local government, were located in urban areas. Nationalisation of land, urban 
planning, social-sector house construction, and communal development only applied to the 
urban area. House construction in rural areas remained a private affair with very limited 
regulations and communal development in rural areas was a matter of so-called self-
contribution.49 The urban-rural division also imposed different understandings of public order. 
Strict regulations for maintaining cleanliness in urban public spaces were introduced as an 
important element of communal self-management. Traditional hybrid urban-rural practices, 
such as peasant markets or holding of cattle, were confined or banned from the urban area.50 In 
the process of expanding the urban area to include informal settlements, the municipality 
abandoned its earlier principle of strict delineation between rural and urban areas. Residents of 
the individual house settlements in the urban periphery were allowed to hold cows and cattle.51 
Individual houses that were incorporated in the expanding city were exempted from tight urban 
construction regulations.52 
The negotiations between individual homebuilders and urban planners also impacted zones 
initially foreseen for social-sector development. When discussing the report on illegal 
homebuilding in 1962 – that is, before the general urbanistic plan was actually adopted – none 
of the members of the people’s council argued for the demolition of the illegal houses, even if 
they were located outside the designated zones for detached housing. Taking into consideration 
the financial means and efforts informal homebuilders had put into their houses and the 
“humanitarian” situation of families – undermining the claim in the report that informal 
homebuilders were rural-to-urban migrants with sufficient means – the municipal authorities 
decided that those informal houses that could not be fitted into the urbanistic whole would be 
tolerated for the time being, provided that the owners agreed to demolish the house themselves 
when actual construction in line with the urban plan would start.53 Informal homebuilders were 
well aware of this policy. Many quickly built a temporary shed and moved in with their family. 
They made use of the long appeal procedures against the demolition of illegal houses and in the 
meantime further constructed their houses, knowing that this would make the actual demolition 
even less likely.54 When negotiating with municipal inspectors, they argued that the appalling 
conditions in their previous homes (often rooms rented from private owners) had a dramatic 
impact on the health of their children and forced them to take matters into their own hands. 
They also guaranteed that they would construct their houses in line with urbanistic requirements 
and demolish them in due time, should urban development require so. Selman Bejtula, for 
example, explained that he had been forced to find shelter for his family after their house had 
been demolished for the construction of the new superphosphate factory. He had built a 
provisional house while waiting for the construction permission. As soon as he would obtain 
permission, he would deconstruct the house and build in accordance with urban requirements.55 
Asan Shaban committed himself to demolishing the house he had built, “without requiring any 
compensation”, but requested that he and his family could stay in the house until the need for 
demolition was urgent.56 Mustafa Shala stated that he did not have the money to build a three-
storey house, as had been foreseen in the urban plan. Considering his family’s urgent need for 
housing, he had been forced to start building a house of two storeys. In case “financial means 
and possibilities” would enable him, he would add another floor to the house to make it conform 
urban planning.57 Many also referred to the fact that they built their houses where others had 
already done so, in areas where the construction of high-rise buildings in line with urban 
planning did not seem to get underway any time soon. Rista Brozović, for example, had decided 
to build a detached house, although the municipal authorities had declined his request for 
construction because the area was designated for high-rise buildings. He countered that “every 
day, new low-rise houses sprouted up in the area” and that it seemed unlikely that high-rise 
buildings would be built any time soon.58  
Municipal authorities were not aloof from these arguments. It was found that it was more 
cost-efficient to use urbanised land for individual house construction where the short-term 
prospects for social-sector development were slim.59 Informal individual houses that had been 
temporarily tolerated de facto obtained permanent status, leading to pockets of detached houses 
in parts of the city that had initially been foreseen for high-rise residential buildings or green 
spaces. One example of such fluid practices of urban zoning concerns the north-western slope 
of “Partisan Hill”, an area in the northern part of the city that had been designated for green 
space, recreation, and commemorative practices in the urban plan of 1963. In May 1962, a 
group of five landowners wrote directly to Petar Stambolić, one of the top figures in the Serbian 
League of Communists, to intervene on their behalf with the municipal people’s council. They 
had bought land on Partisan Hill that had been located outside the urban area with the purpose 
to build houses privately. They aligned their private interests with the collective, arguing that 
they wanted to build their own houses “in order not to burden society”.60 The municipality 
initially declined their request, but two years later revised the urban plan – only one year after 
it was adopted – and determined that the area on Partisan Hill would be developed for single-
family houses with gardens.61  
The reciprocate integration of individual homebuilding came to a close in the late 1970s, 
when a new phase of intensive urban development came under way. The label “illegal” was 
replaced with “wild”. There were still complaints about the fact that “residents had built their 
houses without paying much attention to the urbanistic plan” and that individual house 
construction had led to the irrational use of land.62 However, there was no more mentioning of 
its incompatibility with long-term urban development or the need to demolish informal housing 
when urban development required so. In the framework of the general reconstruction of the city 
taking place at this time (see below), considerable attention was paid to the communal 
development of informal house settlements as compensation for what was seen as the lack of 
investment for communal development in these areas.63 New areas for individual homebuilding 
were developed. Reflecting the typically West-European concept of suburbs, these were praised 
as having clean air, surely an important asset in the extremely polluted industrial city.64 Whereas 
in the early 1960s, informal homebuilding was excluded from the here and now of socialist 
urbanity as a primitive and ultimately selfish rural practice, individual house construction by 
the second half of the 1970s had become an inalienable right of “citizens” and “working people” 
to use the means they had at their disposal to improve their living conditions. Informal 
homebuilders were no longer categorised as rural newcomers, but as legitimate socialist 
urbanites. Moreover, the individual interests of private homebuilders did not clash with the 
broader collective interest. Rather the opposite, private homebuilders were said to “unburden” 
society, as they did not occupy social-sector flats and liberated means for housing for the truly 
needy.65 Individual homebuilding thus brought the individual to the foreground while aligning 
individual interests with collective needs, in a clear example of the individualising turn of 
socialist urban development. 
 
Social-sector housing: from soliters to solidarity 
The turn to a more individualist understanding of socialist urbanity was not only evident in the 
integration and formalisation of individual homebuilding. In this part, I shift the attention to 
social-sector housing and show how policy changes and reforms reduced the collectivist 
function and social reputation of social-sector housing. Put schematically, social-sector housing 
evolved from a privileged site of communal self-management to a social good for redistribution 
to vulnerable parts of the population. The stand-alone high-rise towers or soliters that had 
served as the hallmark of urban modernity in early conceptions of socialist urbanisation in the 
1960s had become undesired dwellings targeted for solidarity purposes by the 1980s. As with 
informal homebuilding, I argue that the shifting reputation of social-sector housing was the 
outcome of the processual nature of local urban development.  
Mass urbanisation programmes in the post-Stalinist Soviet Union and its Central and Eastern 
European satellites introduced a degree of individual ownership unknown in pre-war 
understandings of socialist urban modernity. This did not amount to a complete shift to radical 
individualism. In a return to Leninist collectivistic discourse, new urbanistic designs aimed to 
align individual with collective interests.66 The neighbourhood and the residential building 
played crucial roles in performing the collectivistic functions of the socialist city.67 In Socialist 
Yugoslavia’s variation on post-Bolshevik socialist urbanisation, two basic units of social self-
management stand out. So-called residential communities gathered residents at the 
neighbourhood level; house councils in social-sector apartment buildings. 
Residential communities provided social and communal services to facilitate the daily lives 
of households and in particular employed women with children. Part of the aggregate rent went 
to the residential communities, but in the spirit of Yugoslav self-management, they were 
expected to become self-sustainable. Residential communities typically organise child care, 
small household services, and technical reparation services. Through consumers’ councils that 
overlooked the work of shops, they protected the consumption interests of residents. They also 
organised reconciliation councils for solving disputes outside of court.68 The residential 
community was an exclusively urban phenomenon and spatially structured around 
neighbourhood centres providing social, commercial, and cultural services.69 Its parallel in rural 
areas was the local council, which served as a body for rural self-help in communal affairs, but 
was much less ideologically charged and did not receive any formal support. 
Mitrovica’s urban plan clearly formulated the neighbourhoods’ function to align individual 
and collective interests. They had the goal to “intensify socio-political life’ and “integrate every 
individual in a constructive endeavour to solve problems of interest for each individual, his 
residential community, city, and our entire society”.70 The city was subdivided in two 
residential communities. Bair comprised the pre-socialist city south of the Ibër. It covered 2/3 
of the urban area with around 18,000 inhabitants. Ibar was located to the north of the river and 
had 9,000 inhabitants.71 Residential community Ibar was clearly privileged, comprising the 
new socialist neighbourhood with its social-sector housing and designated infrastructure for 
service provision and communal life. The Ottoman-era commercial bazaar across the river was 
the counter-image of the modern communal environment north of the river. Much like illegal 
homebuilding at the same time, it was labelled primitive and of poor aesthetic and material 
quality. The urban plan envisaged the complete demolition of the pre-socialist city and placed 
it outside the future-oriented here and now of socialist modernity.  
It quickly became clear, however, that the collectivistic functions of residential communities 
remained dead letter. In terms of service provision, the residential communities could not 
compete with private artisans in the old city centre. They were more expensive and the quality 
of services was poor due to bad equipment and unskilled workers. Residential communities also 
did not dispose of adequate infrastructure for service provision, even in the new part of the city 
where residential buildings included space for stores and shops. The child care centre in Ibar 
was one of the symbols of socialist urban modernity in the new part of the city, but it was not 
fully booked. In reality, the socialist neighbourhood continued to rely on the private services 
provided by craftsmen in the old bazaar, although these were constantly tarred for being 
particularly susceptible to economic crimes (tax evasion, poor labour conditions), poor services, 
and long waiting times. Modern canteens were one of the emblematic modern services 
residential communities were supposed to provide, but instead, various private chickpea and 
seed sellers with deplorable hygienic conditions mushroomed in the city.72  
The Constitution of 1963 created the local community, a new body for local self-
management, which replaced the urban residential communities and the rural local councils. At 
first sight, local communities seemed to strengthen the collectivistic functions of residential 
communities. They were defined as voluntary associations of citizens providing assistance in 
urban (child care, housekeeping, house management, and communal services) and rural 
domains (maintenance of land and graveyards, protection from natural disasters, and 
cleanliness).73 Local communities were heavily ideologised. They served as an important body 
in the process of the withering away of the state. They provided the framework for direct 
socialist democracy and the socio-political organisation of citizens by delegating 
representatives to the municipal assembly. In practice, however, local communities became 
increasingly intangible. Frequent calls in the local press to intensify the work of local 
communities show that these had become an ideologically charged but empty box.74  
Tertiary activities, the most concrete competences of residential communities, were 
transferred to professional municipal enterprises or private shopkeepers and craftsmen. The 
loss-making services provided by the residential communities were merged into a new 
communal enterprise. The child care centre was turned into a social institution directly run by 
the municipality.75 The municipality also started promoting private shops, craftsmen, and 
markets through beneficial taxation, rent, and credit regimes and the provision of adequate 
locations in future urban planning (including in the bazaar). It recognised that social-sector 
shops and services had failed to improve the living standard of the urban population. Similar to 
informal homebuilding, private shopkeepers partially filled this gap but were working on the 
margins of legality and as a consequence the quality of their work was appalling. The 
municipality aimed to formalise and legalise private commercial activities and at the same time 
stepped up inspection against irregularities, in order to increase competition and ultimately 
quality.76  
The second site for performing the collectivistic function of social-sector urban 
development was the apartment building. Per building, tenants elected house councils which 
were financed from part of the rent. The house councils cared for the maintenance of the 
building and the public spaces in the house. They were also responsible for rent collection and 
tenancy contracts.77 The councils were particularly tasked with aligning individual and 
collective interests. They overlooked whether tenants made use of the house in an urbane and 
civilised manner. Explicitly forbidden were uncivil acts associated with rural life, such as 
storing goods in the common spaces, using toilets for throwing away garbage, drying laundry 
on balconies, chopping wood for heating and storing firewood inside the house, keeping 
animals, and singing and shouting.78  
The prominent role of house councils in communal self-management remained short-lived, 
however. Parallel to the professionalization of services provided by residential communities, 
the housing reforms of 1965 transferred much of the competences and financial means of house 
councils to newly established municipal housing enterprises. The municipal housing enterprise 
became a crucial player in the reformed housing market. It managed the social-sector housing 
stock in the municipality on the basis of market principles. It was tasked to charge market-
conform rents, buy and sell real estate, and invest in social-sector housing in a profitable 
manner. Judging by the primary objective of the housing reforms to improve the quality of 
social-sector house management and increase social-sector house construction, the market 
reforms failed badly.79 The number of new social-sector dwellings in Mitrovica stagnated and 
then dropped completely in the early 1970s. Mitrovica’s local press noted that the municipal 
housing enterprise did not have financial means, that it failed dramatically to collect rents, and 
that the quality of maintenance was appalling.80 Trepça was the sharpest critic of the market 
orientation in social-sector housing. The enterprise was the main shareholder in the municipal 
housing enterprise, owning over 70% of the social-sector housing stock, and relied on the 
construction and maintenance of social-sector housing for the attraction of badly-needed 
specialists. It was thus particularly hit by the poor work of the housing enterprise.81  
The changing power relations in local urban development created new coalitions, roughly 
aligning Trepça with the larger dissatisfied urban population against the municipal housing 
enterprise and a small elite profiteering from the socialist housing market. The former 
appropriated a more individualising understanding of socialist urbanity, which combined the 
private interests of the large majority with collective solidarity. In the early 1970s, Trepça’s 
factory journal organised a questionnaire among the workforce to discuss the privatisation of 
the social-sector housing stock as a way out of the impasse.82 Respondents were unanimous in 
criticising the work of the housing enterprise. It was said that the enterprise was only interested 
in collecting rent, but did not provide quality services in exchange. All respondents supported 
the idea that Trepça would privatise its flats and a large majority of them expressed willingness 
to buy enterprise flats provided that Trepça would give favourable loans. Two types of 
respondents had no intentions to buy a flat. Specialists, who often came from outside the region 
and did not plan to stay with the enterprise, were not interested in buying real estate. These 
were indeed the primary target group of social-sector housing in the late 1950s and early 1960s. 
A second group consisted of those who had their own houses in the city or the rural hinterland 
and did not see the need to move to a flat. 
The latter group set the standard for many of their fellow workers. A returning argument 
made by the respondents for the privatisation of the enterprise’s housing stock was that 
inhabitants would take better care of private homes. Many stated that they preferred a detached 
or low-rise house over a flat in a high-rise tower. They complained that the maintenance of 
high-rise residential buildings was below standard and living conditions were hard (complaints 
about the lack of water and dysfunctional elevators were particularly frequent). They preferred 
to have their own house and garden, because this provided more security and a sense of 
ownership. A second argument for privatisation made by the respondents linked private 
homeownership to social justice. The enterprise could use the funds obtained through the 
privatisation to build houses for those workers who had not gained access to social-sector 
housing.  
This point is crucial for understanding the shifts in social-sector housing. Social justice had 
been an intrinsic element of the housing reforms of the mid-1960s. Market-based urban 
development was expected to redistribute means from the more affluent parts of society – 
essentially those already living in social-sector housing or those willing to pay higher rents for 
flats of higher comfort – to the larger part of society that had not gained access to socialist 
urbanity.83 The sharp increase of communal and rental prices and the decline of new houses in 
social ownership, however, made such redistribution increasingly unlikely. Particularly 
problematic for the socialist state was that industrial production workers were disproportionally 
represented among the part of the population living in substandard housing conditions.84  
In criticising the housing reforms, Trepça gave expression to workers’ dissatisfaction with 
persistent housing inequalities using the multi-faceted language of self-management.85 This is 
ironic, as the monopolistic hold of Trepça over urban development up to the early 1960s had in 
fact led to sharp socio-occupational differentiation in the new high-rise housing estates in the 
northern part of the city. The widespread phenomenon of people moving into enterprise-owned 
apartments without formal approval indicates the perception of social inequality in the 
enterprise’s housing politics. Particularly frequent were cases of people moving into apartments 
upon agreement with the former tenant but without notifying the enterprise. In other cases, 
people simply moved into empty apartments as soon as tenants moved out. House occupiers 
legitimised their act by referring to their difficult housing situation and their right to housing. 
Novak Marković, for example, claimed that as a miner with a long service record he had the 
right to move into one of Trepça’s enterprise flats in the miners’ settlement of Stanterg (Stari 
Trg), even though he did not have a formal approval. Moreover, he had himself reached an 
agreement with the previous tenant and was living with his wife, a small child, and a new-born 
baby in a small one-room flat in appalling conditions. Marković referred to the common 
practice in Stanterg, where “people move in and out as it pleases them.”86 
In the early 1970s, Trepça’s factory journal started a public shaming campaign with names 
and details of people engaged in fraudulent transactions with the enterprise’s housing stock. 
Feeding the social dissatisfaction among the majority of the workforce, the campaign focussed 
on managers and specialists who had rented out or transferred the right to use their flat to family 
members or acquaintances after moving away or receiving a new flat. Many had also received 
credit for individual homebuilding, while at the same time renting a flat in social ownership. 
They abused the lack of political control resulting from the market reforms and used their 
connections with “responsible people” in the municipal housing enterprise for private 
enrichment.87 In response to the combined concerns of social inequality and fraud in social-
sector housing and the apparent failure of market-oriented housing reforms, the League of 
Communists reaffirmed the need for political control over housing in defence of the interests 
of the large part of society that had been disadvantaged in social-sector housing. The key word 
was solidarity. Not only should tenants of social housing contribute to expanded production by 
paying higher communal costs, socially-vulnerable groups should also gain access to housing 
at favourable conditions.88  
In the second half of the 1970s, solidarity became an integral part of a new phase of urban 
development in Mitrovica. A substantial part of investments in social-sector high-rise buildings 
targeted vulnerable layers of the population who had been on waiting lists for social-sector 
housing for years. By this time, social-sector housing had degraded, however, to the bottom of 
the urban hierarchy, in terms of appreciation of aesthetics and living quality. The urban 
reconstruction plan of the late 1970s and early 1980s foresaw the preservation and 
reconstruction of part of the old bazaar, which had been excluded from socialist modernity in 
the early 1960s, but was now praised as the “calm part of the city” and served to “break the 
greyness the city due to the construction of new residential buildings”.89 Solidarity housing 
estates were located in zones of low priority. The miners’ settlement of Tunel i parë (Prvi Tunel) 
was reconstructed for solidarity purposes but remained poorly connected to urban utilities and 
provisions.90 Another block of “solidarity” buildings was located at the old brickworks site, 
which continued to serve as the central site for the production and transport of cement and 
concrete for the ongoing road works. The residents complained about dust and noise pollution 
and about dysfunctional central heating and elevators.91  
 
Conclusion 
By reconstructing local decision-making in the domain of urban planning in the peripheral and 
medium-sized city of Mitrovica, I have shown the open-ended character of socialist urban 
development and its compatibility with individualising discourses of modernity. The urban plan 
of 1963 reflected the dogmatic collectivistic understanding of socialist urbanity, but was revised 
in the actual practice of urban planning and in fact had limited relevance in urban development. 
The processual nature of socialist urban development led to the reconfiguration of private and 
social-sector urban development. The gradual upgrade of private housing and parallel 
downgrading of social-sector housing was not the outcome of popular subversive strategies and 
the failure of collectivistic socialist urban planning. It reflected shifting negotiations at the local 
level between residents and local actors involved in urban planning, within the structural 
framework of market-oriented policy reforms coming from the Yugoslav central level and 
under-urbanisation. Private housing in the urban peripheries was integrated in the urban fabric 
as the legitimate right of workers to pursue their own individual interests while at the same time 
liberating means for the collective to invest in social-sector housing for the truly needy. In this 
process, the boundaries between urban and rural territories and the moral categories ascribed to 
both were blurred and individual house settlements occupied zones initially foreseen for high-
rise social-sector housing. At the same time, market-oriented reforms in the management of 
social-sector housing reduced the collectivistic functions of social-sector housing and created 
new lines of division between local actors involved in urban planning. Trepça mobilised the 
dissatisfaction among the workforce about housing inequality and criticised a small elite who 
profiteered from market reforms in social-sector housing. In the final phase of socialist urban 
development in the second half of the 1970s, political control over social-sector urban 
development was restored, but the social-private hierarchy had shifted. Social-sector housing 
blocks were located in low-priority zones and targeted the most vulnerable strata of the urban 
population, whereas detached housing settlements guaranteed pleasant living conditions and 
security for the large middle strata of urban residents.  
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Raumbewältigung als Probleme der russischen Geschichte, Karl Schlögel, ed. (Munich: R. 
Oldenbourg, 2011): 149–85.  
68 “Opći zakon o stambenim zajednicama” [General Law on residential communities], Službeni 
list FNRJ [Official Gazette of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia] 15, no. 16 (1959): 
353–68.  
69 Le Normand, Building Tito’s Capital, 85–102; Münnich, Belgrad, 152–79. 
70 Iskra, “Generalni urbanistički plan Kosovske Mitrovice”, 17.  
71 People’s Council of the Municipality of Mitrovica, Minutes of the meeting of February 22, 
1960 (RAM 6–1961/1). 
72 People’s Council of the Municipality of Mitrovica, “Informacija o radu stambenih zajednica” 
[Information on the work of residential communities] (RAM 6 / 1962–2); Council of Work 
Communities of Mitrovica, Minutes of the meeting of February 22, 1965 (RAM 6 / 1965–1).  
73 People’s Council of the Municipality of Mitrovica, “Statut opštine Kosovska Mitrovica” 
[Statute of the Municipality of Mitrovica], Službeni list APKiM 19, no. 39 (1964): 1052–80.  
74 Zvečan, “Mesto i uloga mesne zajednice” [The place and role of the local community], 
November 5, 1966, 3; Zvečan, “Konsolodimi i bashkesive locale” [The consolidation of local 
communities], September 9, 1967, 2; Zvečan, “Jača uloga mesnih zajednica” [A stronger role 
for local communities], April 10, 1971, 3.  
75 Municipal Assembly of Mitrovica, Decision of March 18, 1965 (RAM 6 / 1965–1).  
                                                                                                                                                        
76 Municipal Assembly of Mitrovica, “Informacija o stanju i razvoju tercijarnih delatnosti” 
[Information on the situation and development of tertiary activities] (RAM 6 / 1966–1).  
77 “Zakon o stambenim odnosima” [Law on residential relations], Službeni list FNRJ 15, no. 
16 (1959): 359–77.  
78  People’s Council of the Municipality of Mitrovica, “Odluka o kućnom redu u stanbenim 
zgradama na području opštine Kosovska Mitrovica” [Decision on house order in residential 
buildings on the territory of the municipality of Mitrovica], Službeni list AKMO 15, no. 17 
(1960), 361–63; People’s Council of the Municipality of Mitrovica, “Odluka o kućnom redu” 
[Decision on house order], Službeni list AKMO 16, no. 1 (1961): 21–23. The discourse of 
rural incivility continues to dominate understandings of Southeast European urbanity. See 
Azra Hromadžić, “Streets, Scum and People: Discourses of (In)Civility in Postwar Bihać, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Anthropological Theory 18, no. 2–3 (2018): 326–56. 
79 Le Normand, Building Tito’s Capital, 138–43; Münnich, Belgrad, 205–209. 
80 Zvečan, “Umesto napred, korak nazad” [Instead of forward, a step backward], June 25, 1966, 
1; Zvečan, “Stanari pred sudom” [Tenants before court], July 9. 1966, 3; Zvečan, “Pagesa pake, 
edhe qeraja nuk paguhet” [Low costs, but even rent is not paid], January 9, 1971, 2. 
81 Trepča, “Stanbena problematika: Ko i kako (ne) gazduje” [Housing problems: Who does 
(not) manage and how], March 10, 1971, 10; Trepča, “Prazni fondovi za održavanja” [Empty 
maintenance funds], April 19, 1972, 10.  
82 The following two paragraphs draw on Trepča, “Korisnici o prodaji stanova Kombinata” 
[Users on selling the flats of the Combine], June 16, 1971, 6–7; June 30, 1971, 7–8; July 9, 
1971, 10–11; July 14, 1971, 6.  
83 Živorad Kovačević, “Deset godina komunalnog systema” [Ten years of the communal 
system], Komuna [The Commune] 12, no. 9 (1965): 2–10. 
84 “Solidarnost u stambenoj izgradnji i stanovanju” [Solidarity in house construction and 
housing]. Komuna 20, no. 7–8 (1973): 2–25.  
                                                                                                                                                        
85 Goran Musić aptly notes that Yugoslav socialism oscillated between market and political 
control over the economy. In period of stronger pro-market orientation, workers’ self-
management was seen as the freedom of workers in a single enterprise to make business 
decisions and maximise income. When the party aimed for the increased role of planning, 
emphasis was put on the class dimensions of workers self-management. Goran Musić, “They 
Came as Workers and Left as Serbs: The Role of Rakovica’s Blue-Collar Workers in Serbian 
Social Mobilizations of the late 1980s”, in Socialist Inequalities and Discontent in Yugoslav 
Socialism, Rory Archer, Igor Duda, and Paul Stubbs, eds (London/New York: Routledge, 
2016): 132–54, here 136.  
86 Municipal inspectorate for housing, Report on Novak Marković, December 11, 1963 (RAM 
6 / 1963–31).  
87 Trepča, “Za kim zvone zvona” [For whom do the bells ring], May 5, 1972, 9; May 17, 1972, 
9; Zvečan, “Pozitivna nastojanja mitrovačkih komunista” [Positive endeavours of Mitrovica’s 
communists], July 27, 1968, 1; Zvečan, “Očiti primeri deformacija” [Overt examples of 
deformations], August 3, 1968, 1. On housing inequality and social dissatisfaction in Belgrade 
in the 1980s, see Rory Archer, “Paid For By the Workers, Occupied By the Bureaucrats: 
Housing Inequalities in 1980s Belgrade”, in Socialist Inequalities and Discontent in Yugoslav 
Socialism, Rory Archer, Igor Duda, and Paul Stubbs, eds (London/New York: Routledge, 
2016): 58–76. 
88 Tarik Karavdić, “Deveti kongres SK Jugoslavije i dalji razvoj stambeno-komunalne 
privrede” [The ninth congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and the further 
development of residential-communal economy], Komuna 16, no. 4 (1969): 12–15.  
89 Komuna, list za komunalna i stambena pitanja, “Stara čaršija kao nekad” [The old bazaar as 
it used to be], February 1, 1980, 9.  
90 Komuna, list za komunalna i stambena pitanja, “Prvi Tunel: Gradi se vodovod” [Tunel i 
parë: Water supply under construction], February 1, 1980, 12.   
                                                                                                                                                        
91 Komuna, list za komunalna i stambena pitanja, “Zabeleženo u naselju “Crepociglana”: 
Nevolje “solidaraca”” [Registered in the “Brickworks” neighbourhood: The troubles of the 
“solidarci”], August 22, 1978, 7; Komuna, list za komunalna i stambena pitanja, “Mlado 
naselje – brojni problemi” [Young neighbourhood – Many problems], July 1, 1979, 14.  
